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Chapter 9
Using Pension Funding Bonds in
Defined Benefit Pension Portfolios
Robert M. Lang
Nearly 300 state and local governments in the United States maintain
451 retiremen t plans with collective assets of approximately US $1 tril-
lion. These plans cover more than 13,000,000 municipal employees na-
tionwide, in occupations ranging from state troopers and prison wardens
to city clerks and school teachers (Zorn and Eitelberg 1994). When a
state government's actuaries determine that the present value of plan
benefits exceeds the present value of plan assets, the state is said to have
an unfunded actuarially accrued liability (UAAL) , meaning that it owes
money to its retirement plan. Approximately 200 state and local retire-
ment plans are collectively underfunded by more than US $162 billion
(Zorn and Eitelberg 1994).
This chapter initially seeks to examine the current funding and in-
vestment practices of state and local government retirement plans in a
manner designed to provide an introductory discussion for government
decisionmakers, taxpayer groups, and municipal employees. In this con-
text the concept of pension funding bonds (PFBs) is introduced as a
mechanism for meeting public plans' unfunded liabilities.
When a municipal government owes money to its retirement plan, it
typically funds the deficiency, the UAAL, by making amortization pay-
ments to its plan each year. In addition to amortizing the principal
amount of the UAAL, the municipality must pay interest to its public
retirement plan on the outstanding balance of the UAAL at an interest
rate set by the plan's actuary. The "actuarially assumed interest rate" at-
tempts to compensate the plan for the opportunity cost of not having
money (the UAAL) available to invest in stocks and bonds. In recent
years, this rate has typically been set at 8.09 percent (Zorn and Eitel-
berg 1994).
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As an alternative to repaying the UAAL over time at the acruarially
assumed interest rate, several municipalities, particularly those in Cali-
fornia, have issued pension funding bonds. PFBs are publicly issued
securities sold to bond investors in the well-established United States
municipal securities marketplace; the proceeds are deposited to the mu-
nicipal retirement plan to fund the UAAL. Under certain market condi-
tions, bond investors in the municipal securities marketplace will lend
funds to the government employer at an interest rate that is lower than
the actuarially assumed interest rate, providing substantial savings.
Pension funding bonds are typically backed by the same security as
other state and local debt instruments, requiring the governments ei-
ther to appropriate money annually from generally available funds to
pay debt service or to back the bonds directly with dedicated revenue
sources, such as property taxes. The funds raised by the PFBs are irrevo-
cably deposited to the state or local government retirement plan and
invested by the plan to meet the future retirement needs of its municipal
employees.
For example, the City of Fresno, California issued US $245 million of
PFBs in March 1994. Fresno borrowed the funds at a 7.5 percent inter-
est rate, deposited the proceeds with the City'S retirement system, and
hoped that the system would earn a long-term rate of return of at least
7.5 percent over the next twenty years. There were no guarantees that
the system would be able to achieve this objective, but the system's actu-
aries had projected that the system would earn at least 8 percen t per year,
and the City was paying interest on the US $245 million UAAL at that
8 percent actuarially assumed interest rate. If the system is able to earn
8 percent each year on the invested assets, Fresno will earn US $18 mil-
lion more over the next twenty years than it would earn as a result of an
annual contributions approach. In fact, in the 12 months following the
deposit of the additional US $245 million, Fresno's retirement system
realized a total return in excess of 20 percent-or a gain of US $50 mil-
lion on the funds provided by the PFBs. While Fresno benefited from
uniquely fortuitous timing and generated savings in excess of its ex-
pectations, any public employer that earns a rate of return equal to or
greatet- than its PFB borrowing cost would realize cost savings by funding
its retirement plan with PFBs.
However, the potential cost savings, which come with attendant rein-
vestment risk, need not be the primary motivation for issuing PFBs.
Perhaps the strongest argument in favor of PFB issuance is that a muni-
cipality's irrevocable obligation to make bond debt service payments may
be a more predictable and less discretionary method of funding un-
funded liabilities than a voluntary annual contribution. While the mu-
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nicipal employer, which is by definition governed by a political body, may
choose to postpone or reduce an annual retirement fund contribution,
it is unlikely that it would consider defaulting on an annual principal or
interest payment due on publicly issued debt. Therefore, PFBs can intro-
duce a higher level of discipline into the plan funding process.
These potential benefits also carry attendant drawbacks. First, if the
public plan should fail to earn a long-term rate of t-eturn equal to the
borrowing cost, such as 7.5 percent, the plan may be worse off than if the
employer had continued to make annual contributions to decrease the
unfunded liability. It should be noted, however, that even in the absence
of PFBs a plan that earns less than its assumed rate of return will become
underfunded.
Second, the financial discipline introduced by PFBs also comes at a
price-decreased flexibility. While some state constitutions forbid em-
ployers from withholding annual contributions or lowering future re-
tirement benefits, other state constitutions do permit such actions. Once
PFBs are issued and the proceeds are deposited into the plan, federal
law prohibits municipalities from withdrawing funds. Furthermore, bond
holders must receive their annual payments or the municipality would
be in default.
Furthermore, while it is certainly legal in most states to obligate future
legislatures' actions (long-term highway, school, and hospital bonds are
issued regularly), the decision to issue long-term debt should be given
due consideration as a matter of public policy. One mechanism that
somewhat mitigates the decrease in financial flexibility relating to un-
funded liability payments is that the municipality may retain the ability
to suspend or decrease its future annual contributions even though it
would be obligated to pay the debt service on the PFBs.
Finally, taxpayers and elected officials should be aware that all PFBs
are not created equal. PFBs need not be structured with level annual
debt service payments like a home mortgage. Particularly for large debt
issues, principal amortization can be heavily weighted toward the latter
maturities, including the use of zero-coupon bonds, or can contain so-
phisticated embedded derivatives. While these types of bond structures
may achieve desired payment patterns, PFB issuers would be well advised
to evaluate both the financial risks and intergenerational equity impli-
cations of a given PFB amortization pattern.
This chapter focuses exclusively on state and local government em-
ployers and public retirement plans in the United States, but the funda-
mentals of the discussion relating to the creation of unfunded liabilities,
the investment of plan assets, and funding plan liabilities by issuing debt
securities will hopefully inform discussions in other countries.
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Background
Before discussing current funding and investment practices and subse-
quently examining of PFBs, it will be helpful to make four general obser-
vations about public sector plans.
First, each of the fifty states has its own authorizing legislation govern-
ing retirement plans. This legislation often specifies contribution prac-
tices, actuarial and accounting assumptions, and investment practices.
State and local government plans are exempt from nearly all federal leg-
islation relating to retirement plans, including ERISA. Therefore, states
are bound only by self-imposed rules relating to funding levels and con-
tributions practices. Readers familiar with United States private-sector'
pension plans, or retirement plans in other countries, are forewarned to '
abandon attempts to understand these public plans through the lens of
another paradigm.
Second, public sector plans are overwhelmingly defined benefit, ne-
cessitating additional employer payments if previous contributions and
investment returns are not sufficient to pay benefits. More than 90 per-
cent of public plans are defined benefit, whereas less than 4 percent are
strictly defined contribution, and the remaining 6 percent are combina-
tions of the two approaches (Zorn and Eitelberg 1994).
Third, more than 85 percent of the assets of the median municipal
plan is invested in publicly traded domestic equities and domestic bonds
(Zorn and Eitelberg 1994).
Finally, it is assumed that all state and local governments are experi-
enced issuers of bonds in the capital markets. In fact, more than US
$160 billion of municipal debt instruments are issued each year to fund
the construction of schools, roads, hospitals, and other public projects.
Current Practices for Determining Public Plan
Benefits and Contributions
To understand how PFBs can be used to change contribution mecha-
nisms, it is helpful first to examine the status quo methods for estimating
future benefit levels and determining the amount of annual contribu-
tions necessary to fund plan liabilities.
Policymakers face three challenges in addressing projected funding
shortfalls. First, future benefit levels, which are the liabilities of the re-
tirement plan, are difficult to predict. Second, even if liabilities can be
determined with certainty, different funding methods have different
consequences for how liabilities are shared between current and fu-
ture taxpayers. Third, because benefits are practically irrevocable once
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granted, employers cannot pursue reductions in plan benefits as a means
for matching assets and liabilities.
Plan Liabilities
Defined benefit plans expose municipal employers to significant finan-
cial uncertainty due to the possibility that the actual level of benefits paid
to retired members may significantly diverge from projections.
Estimated Funding Levels
Paul Zorn and Cathie G. Eitelberg have compiled an excellent data-
base of information about public pension plans for the Public Pension
Coordinating Council (PPCC) from the responses of 300 public pension
systems (some with multiple retirement plans) that account for more
than 75 percent of all public plan membership in the United States
(Zorn and Eitelberg 1994). Approximately 200 of the 451 state and local
government plans in the PPCC survey are collectively underfunded by
more than US $162 billion (Zorn and Eitelberg 1994).
It is helpful to put these liabilities in perspective. The average fund-
ing ratio of public plans has increased from 79.8 percent in 1991 to
82.1 percent in 1992 (Zorn and Eitelberg 1994). Only 16 percent of pub-
lic plans are less than 70 percent funded, while 47 percent are more than
90 percent funded (Zorn and Eitelberg 1994). However, further explo-
ration into the arcane world of actuarial projections reveals that pro-
jected plan liabilities are relatively uncertain, and plan valuations change
when different actuarial methods and assumptions are used.
Different Actuarial Methods Indicate Different Funding Levels
There are many accepted actuarial methods for forecasting a system's
future assets and liabilities, just as an equity can be valued using the
cost, market value, or discounted cash flow methods. Describing the dif-
ferences between actuarial methods, such as the "entry age normal"
method and the "projected unit credit" method, is beyond the scope of
this chapter. It is sufficient to note that different actuarial methods pro-
duce vastly different indications of a plan's funding ratio (the present
value of plan assets over the present value of plan liabilities).
The decision to change a plan's actuarial accounting method can have
important political implications, as a low funding ratio could require a
state to make additional contributions to its retirement plan while a high
funding ratio may provide employers with bargaining power to avoid fur-
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ther increases in employee benefits. It is not uncommon to findjurisdic- :
tions with similar local retirement plans (such as adjoining water districts i
in the same metropolitan area) using different actuarial methods. i
C1w.nges in Actuarial Assumptions Affect Funding Levels
Even among plans with the same actuarial method, underlying as-
sumptions can vary widely. One plan may forecast inflation at a 3 percent
annual rate of increase, while another may assume a 5 percent annual
increase-producing vastly different outcomes. Because federal laws
such as ERlSA do not apply to public plans, actuarial assumptions can
be changed under state or local law, either for sound financial reasons
or to obtain politically desirable funding projections and annual contri- .
bution levels.
Political MotivationsfOr C1w.nges in Funding Methodologies and Assumptions
Some state and local lawmakers have become proficient at manipulat-
ing actuarial assumptions and methods to provide additional retirement
benefits without increasing the level of annual contributions during
their term of office.
Public employees are a powerful constituency-they are numerous,
unionized, have a strong motivation to participate in the democratic pro- .
cess, and perform functions essential to the jurisdiction's well-being. For
these reasons, publicly elected officials take employee requests for addi-
tional compensation quite seriously. Should the lawmakers agree to in-
crease employee compensation, they may choose to increase either
current wages or future pension payments (or a combination of the two.)
State and local governments are required to maintain balanced an-
nual budgets. Therefore, current wage increases would necessitate either
cuts in funding for other programs or higher taxes. However, lawmakers
may instead choose to grant unfunded retirement benefits, pleasing
both public employees and beneficiaries ofother programs (whose fund-
ing would otherwise be cut). Increased benefits without additional con-
tributions create, or augment, an unfunded liability, tllereby shifting the
cost of the wage increases from current taxpayers to future taxpayers. For
state and local governments, the ability to create unfunded off-balance
sheet obligations, such as unfunded pension liabilities, is almost as pow-
erful as the ability to print money.
To address this problem, some states require by law that benefits can-
not be increased if the action will create or increase the state's unfunded
pension liability. To overcome this obstacle some lawmakers have cre-
Robert M. Lang 165
atively recognized that even small changes in actuarial assumptions, such
as an increase in projected investment returns, can create a plan surplus
large enough to absorb additional benefits. Alternatively, a state legisla-
ture may choose to change or make an exception to its own law and grant
state employees additional benefits despite the creation of unfunded
liabilities.
These observations do not suggest that the majority of changes to ac-
LUarial methods and assumptions are politically motivated. However, a
discussion of funding levels and annual contributions practices for pub-
lic plans would be incomplete without addressing the political implica-
tions of different approaches.
Actual Results Vary from Assumptions
Even plans with stable actuarial methods and assumptions find that
actual plan experience differs from projections. For example, a munici-
pality's actual payroll growth rate will be determined by both inflation
and raises for merit and seniority. Similarly, the amount of benefits that
a plan must pay will be influenced by the plan's actual mortality and dis-
ability experience. Plans that have few members, are concentrated in a
small geographic area, or are segregated by occupation, for example,
may experience large gaps between statistically predicted outcomes and
actual results.
Benefits Reductions Legally Prohibited
Once benefits are granted to state and local government employees,
strong legal protections as well as political pressures largely preclude cuts
in pension benefits. This rules out benefit cuts as a financial tool for
matching assets and liabilities.
Analysis of the Government Finance Officers' Association (GFOA)
database reveals that benefit levels for 96 of the 286 plans with unfunded
liabilities (33.5 percent) cannot be reduced, as mandated by state consti-
tution, city charter, or a court order (Zorn and Eitelberg 1994; author's
computation) .
These protected plans account for US $53.7 billion of unfunded li-
abilities, or one-third of municipal employers' collective unfunded lia-
bility of US $162 billion. This protection is fairly strong, as changes to a
state's constitution or a city's charter require difficult procedural maneu-
vers and must additionally be directly approved by a vote of the people.
A further 181 plans, or 40 percent of the total, have benefit levels pro-
tected by state statute (Zorn and Eitelberg 1994; author's computation).
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While this statutory protection is somewhat weaker, benefit decreases:
still require the approval of both houses of a state legislature as well as :
the signature of the state's governor.
Plan Contribution Practices
Annual contributions to public plans include both "normal contribu- .
tions" to meet the future liabilities of current employees and "UAAL .
amortization payments" to payoff the municipality's unfunded pension ~
liability. Total annual contributions exceed US $37 billion per year, with
US $24.6 billion provided by employers and the remaining US $12.9 bil-
lion provided by employees (Zorn and Eitelberg 1994).
However, municipalities are becoming increasingly aware of the bud-
getary benefits of creating money by "deferring" pension plan contri-
butions. In 1995 New York City was scheduled to contribute US $106
million per month to its plans but, according to a spokesperson, "New
York City was forced by a cash shortage to defer US $212 million in [two]
monthly payments to its pension funds" (Adler and Sacco 1995). Thus
New York City chose to spend its revenues on higher priorities, including
bond debt service, increasing its future obligations to its pension plans.
Even though plans are generally healthy now, the continued adequate
funding of public plans is an important matter of public policy. Particu-
larly in small states or political subdivisions, plans that become severely
underfunded could either impose severe burdens on future taxpayers or
force public retirees to accept lower benefits than they had been previ-
ously promised.
Practicesfor Repaying Unfunded Pension Liabilities: Level Percentage ofPayroll
Versus LevelAnnual Payments
Many municipalities with unfunded liabilities choose to fund the
UAAL through a standard actuarial method, the contribution ofa "level
percentage of payroll" each year. For example, a city's normal contribu-
tion may be 12 percent of its payroll, and its UAAL amortization payment
may be an additional 8 percent of payroll each year. While the "level
percentage of payroll" repayment method is widely practiced and is con-
sistent with actuarially accepted standards, it causes the VAAL to in-
crease dramatically for many years despite its claim to be an amortization
method. The repayment of a UAAL in this manner requires steeply in-
creasing annual payments. Alternatively, plans may choose to amortize
unfunded liabilities using a "level annual payment" method, but this
practice requires much higher annual payments in the short run.
In comparing the two approaches, it is useful to consider a conven-
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tional fixed-rate mortgage for a home or business loan. Lenders gener-
ally require equal monthly payments, divided between principal and
interest. In certain situations, if the amount of the loan is very large rela-
tive to the borrower's income, the lender may permit a short period of
time in which interest is paid but no principal is amortized. However, it
is very unusual for the lender to allow the borrower to incur additional
indebtedness in order to pay the interest due on the original loan, an
ignominious practice known as negative amortization.
Level Percentage ofPayroll and Negative Amortization
When a municipality amortizes its unfunded liabilities through the
"level percentage of payroll" method, the employer frequently fails to
make large enough annual contributions even to cover the interest due
on the UAAL.
For example, the State of Louisiana has a total unfunded liability of
more than US $7.2 billion. The average actuarially assumed interest rate
for the State of Louisiana's various plans is 8.25 percent and therefore,
just to make interest payments on its UAAL each year, the state should
pay US $600 million per year to its plans (Office of Legislative Auditor
State of Louisiana 1993; author's computations).
In fact, in accordance with standard actuarial practice, state forecasts
call for only US $400 million in annual contributions over the next few
years, adding another US $200 million per year to its UAAL. Due to this
logic, the state's unfunded liability is projected to grow for the next
twenty years until it reaches a maximum of US $10.5 billion. At that
point, it is projected that the state will rapidly amortize its UAAL with US
$1.5 billion per year of amortization payments (these payments will be
in addition to the normal contributions due). The state's total payments
to meet interest and principal on the US $7.2 billion UAAL over the next
32 years are projected to exceed US $27 billion (Office of Legislative
Auditor State of Louisiana 1993; author's computations).
Louisiana has very strong state constitutional protections precluding
decreases in public employee benefits (Office of Legislative Auditor
State of Louisiana 1993). Therefore, the only choice available to the tax-
payers and their elected officials is between significantly increasing cur-
rent UAAL payments at least to meet the current interest cost or to
continue to incur negative amortization by deferring the payments into
the future at an even greater cost.
Louisiana should not be uniquely criticized for these practices. Its ex-
perience is typical, as over 200 public plans have UAALs (Zorn and Eitel-
berg 1994), and the level percentage of payroll method is a commonly
accepted practice for the amortization of unfunded liabilities.
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Proponents of the level percentage of payroll method argue that if
future payrolls are not as large as projected, future benefits requirements
will not be as large either, and thus plans are not exposed to significant'
funding risks. However, use of this amortization method raises important.
public policy questions. Many of these implications are beyond the scope
of this chapter, but one consequence-the difficulty that this practice
causes when attempting to refinance the UAAL-will be addressed be-
low in the discussion of pension funding bonds.
To summarize the liability outlook, plans are generally healthy, but
defined benefit plan liabilities are difficult to predict, reductions in .
benefits are often legally prohibited, and some actuarially recommended
funding methods allow the UAAL to increase for decades before mean:,
ingful principal repayments are contributed. Despite the overall strength .
of most public plans, the dollar amount of public plan unfunded liabil- .
ities should convince state and local governments to explore mecha- .
nisms to fund their retirement plans more efficiently.
This discussion of liabilities provides important background informa-
tion necessary to understand how PFBs can be used to alter current con- '
tributions practices. It is also helpful to understand how public plans
invest the contributions that are made by public employers.
Public Plan Investments
In sum, public plans primarily invest in marketable securities, such as
publicly traded equities and investment grade bonds. Investments may
also include assets as commodities, real estate, non-investment grade
bonds, but these types of investments typically account for only a small
portion of a plan's asset allocation. Most public plans operate in perpe-
tuity and attempt to meet all current obligations with current contribu-
tions and income from invested assets. Therefore, the corpus of a public
plan's assets are generally invested to provide protection of principal,
and a balance between capital appreciation and current income.
Investment Policy and Asset Allocation
The investment policy and asset allocation of a public pension plan is
either defined by statute or determined by the retirement plan's board
members. This policy may prohibit the plan from owning certain types
of assets, such as foreign real estate or derivatives. As noted above, a typi-
cal public plan allocates 85 percent of assets among domestic equities
and bonds. Typically, less than 10 percent of plan assets are held in so-
called "risk-free" investments such as short-term United States govern-
ment securities (Zorn and Eitelberg 1994). Because ERISA standards do
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not apply to state and local government plans, public retirement boards
retain the discretion to take a great deal of financial risk or no risk at all
(except to the extent that investment policies are directed by state and/
or local laws) .
Public plans do change their asset allocations over time, based on
both fluctuating expectations about the relative returns of different asset
classes and the forecasted cash-flow needs of the individual plan. To the
extent that a public plan reallocates its assets among different asset
classes based on a particular forecast of equity returns or interest rates,
the plan engages in market timing. While plan contributions do come in
over time, such as US $25 million per month, and therefore provide
plans with the opportunity to realize returns similar to "dollar cost aver-
aging" techniques, in reality when a plan shifts its asset allocation it
moves a tremendous amoun t of funds from one sector to another. These
reallocations more than offset the long-term averaging effect that could
result from consistently investing a fixed amount of money in a fixed-
asset allocation. The practice of market timing is not necessarily harmful
(in fact, as discussed below, public plan returns in recent years have been
above expectations); however, it is important to recognize that public
plans actively make decisions about movements in interest rates or equity
prices and take meaningful financial risks every day with a significant
amounts of funds.
Investment Return Objectives
The typical (median) public plan assumes that it will earn an 8.09 per-
cent long-term rate of return on its investments. Public plans responding
to the PPCC survey cited above realized an average investment return of
10.62 percent per year from 1988 through 1992 (Zorn and Eitelberg
1994) .
My Do Public Plans Invest in Equities and Corporate Bonds
Instead a/Treasury Bills?
State and local governments take financial risks, including both mar-
ket risk and credit risk, by purchasing equities and corporate bonds. Plan
investments also typically include long-term government bonds, such as
federal agency securities, which protect the plan from credit risk but still
carry interest-rate risk. Taxpayers can benefit from this investment ap-
proach because these asset classes have historically provided a greater
long-term rate of return than Treasury bills, requiring less taxpayer
contributions to the public plan.
It is important to recognize, however, that the vast majority of public
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plan assets are invested in securities whose values Auctuate over time.'
Public retirement plans actively make investment decisions, involving biI-'
lions of dollars each year, to choose which securities to sell, hold, or buy
based on a plan's view of the relative performance of different market'
sectors. For example, a plan may previously have given 5 percent of its'
portfolio to a particular money manager focusing on overseas equities;'
after reevaluating its investment alternatives, the plan may choose to '
shift the funds to a domestic money manager focusing on "small<ap" :
domestic equities.
The reallocation of assets among asset classes is a well-established and
widespread practice for public funds; in fact, if public funds were subject
to ERISA, a diversification among asset classes and particular holdings ~
would be required by federal law. While this practice of investing in mar- '
ketable securities and making sector decisions among asset classes may ,
appear relatively straightforward to seasoned pension money managers, '
public plan investment practices may be relatively unknown among the
general public. In fact, as will be discussed below, one of the primary
concerns raised by opponents ofPFBs is that a public employer may er-
roneously decide that interest rates are unusually low, issue PFBs, and
provide the bond proceeds to its public employee retirement plan,
which then purchases investments that perform poorly.
It is helpful to put the general discussion of PFBs into context by rec-
ognizing that public retirement plans make multi-billion dollar judg-
ment calls (more eloquently described as "investment decisions" or
"asset allocations") about future interest rates and equity prices every
day through their actions in purchasing securities, selling securities, or
even by simply holding existing positions. There is nothing inherently
wrong with public plans makingjudgment calls; in fact, each public plan
is required by its own investment policy guidelines to make such deci-
sions. Despite what may be conventional wisdom, public plans (and to
some extent their contributing employers, who often participate in re-
tirement board meetings) are not inexperienced in considering sophis-
ticated issues relating to market timing and the relative performance of
different asset classes.
Legal Status ofPublic Plan Investment Ownership Is Risley
One feature of public plans that not only raises concerns about
whether PFB proceeds should be contributed to public plans, but more
generally concerns both retirees and taxpayers, is that public plan assets
remain under the ownership of the contributing employer in the event
of a municipal bankruptcy.
The credit quality of the employer is important not only because the
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employer is the source of future contributions but also because the em-
ployer often holds all assets purchased with past contributions. "[P] ar-
ticipants in 457 (state and local) plans are particularly nervous following
the Orange County, California bankruptcy. Because 457 plans ... are the
property ~f the employer, the assets are subject to the claims of.general
creditors If the employers go bankrupt. In contrast, corporate retirement
plans ... are required by ERISA to hold employee contributions in sepa-
rate trusts" (Adler and Sacco 1995).
The use of plan assets is one of the few instances in which federal reg-
ulations govern state and local retirement plans. Prior to the Tax Reform
Act of 1986, municipal employers would borrow money by issuing low-
interest rate tax-exempt PFBs and invest the PFB proceeds into its public
retirement fund, which invested in higher-yielding taxable securities
(but was not required to pay tax on the investment returns). This ap-
proach created arbitrage gains, at the expense of the federal govern-
ment, by exploiting the power Congress gave municipalities to issue
taX-exempt bonds. As a result of the 1986 federal tax reform act, mu-
nicipalities may not issue tax-exempt bonds to fund retirement con-
tributions, and all contributions made to public plans are irrevocable.
(Ironically, this prevented Orange County, California from using retire-
ment fund investments to avoid bankruptcy while simultaneously jeop-
ardizing public employee retirement funds once the County was in
bankruptcy by subjecting the employee funds to the claims of general
creditors.)
As a result, public employees face meaningful credit exposure to the
future financial condition of their employer, both for job security and
retirement security. In some jurisdictions, such as a city or a state, the
government may be able to make up for poor investment returns in its
retirement plan by using surplus funds, making cuts to government pro-
grams, or raising taxes to increase contributions. If a public employer
declares bankruptcy, or has no taxing authority and only limited ability
to increase revenues (e.g., a turnpike authority), employees may ulti-
mately be forced to accept decreased pension benefits despite state con-
stitutional and statutory protections. Public retirees who are citizens of
the jurisdiction would be particularly impacted, as they may otherwise
benefit from government programs that would be cut, would pay a share
of the resulting tax increases, and would receive diminished retirement
benefits. Federal government pension plan insurance does not extend
to state and local government retirement plans, which are exempt from
nearly all federal regulation and do not pay insurance premiums to the
federal government.
In sum, state and local government plan assets are invested in securi-
ties that carry inherent credit and investment risk, state and local govern-
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ment plan assets are not protected from employer bankruptcy by legal
structures, and public retirees' future retirement benefits are not pro-
tected by federal pension insurance.
Public Policy Implications of
Current Public Sector Approach
The continuing performance of public sector funds will fundamentally
impact the financial position of state and local governments. Meaningful
adjustments to the current approach to public pension plans may be de-
sirable. However, based on the legal hurdles to implementing changes,
such as state constitution and city charter requirements, and the author's
interviews with public plan decisionmakers, fundamental changes (such
as adopting a defined contribution plan) are more likely to be discussed
than implemented by the nation's largest public employers. Further-
more, federal law changes;such as alterations in the legal ownership of
457 plans or the integration of state and local government plans into the
federal private-employer pension plan guaranty system, appear even
more remote. Therefore, in the absence of major changes, the only
course of action available to state and local government employers is to
make the best of the pension system they have inherited, specifically by
maximizing investment returns and minimizing funding costs at accept-
able levels of risk.
Tremendous attention is given to maximizing public plans' investment
returns, and performance results are carefully scrutin ized each quarter
to assure that plan returns match or outperform relevant benchmarks
such as the S&P 500 index. Because public plans choose to maintain
more than 85 percent of their assets in publicly traded securities, it is
reasonable to conclude that public plans are well-served by the capital
markets.
Comparatively less attention has been given to the idea of using the
capital markets to fund US $162 billion in unfunded liabilities more ef-
ficiently. The following sections describe pension funding bonds and the
impact that the approach can have on a municipality's ongoing financial
operations.
Capital Markets Approach to Funding Liabilities:
Pension Funding Bonds (PFBsJ
Funding a defined benefit pension system with invested assets is a com-
plex and dynamic process. Issuing bonds to provide contributions in a
lump sum is only one of many changes that can be made to alter the
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public plans. Interest on these bonds was exempt from both federal and
state personal income taxes (thus, carrying a below-market interest
cost), and the investments purchased by the plans accrued tax-free until
paid out as benefits. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 prohibited further is-
suance of federally tax-exempt bonds to fund public retirement plans,
which eliminated the municipalities' risk-free tax arbitrage (although
individual states may continue to exempt interest on PFBs from state
taxes). After 1986, municipalities could only issue pension bonds at in-
terest rates comparable to corporate bond interest rates, which were gen-
erally higher than the plans' projected rates of return. Therefore, given
the changes in tax laws and proportionately high interest rates relative
to plans' expected rates of return, PFBs faded into obscurity.
In 1993, however, long-tenn bond interest rates declined to their low-
est levels in more than twenty years. Municipalities believed that it was
cost-effective to issue PFBs to repay their VAAL in full, as the PFB
borrowing cost declined below the plans' expected rates of return. By
the end of 1994, California cities and counties had issued more than US
$4 billion of PFBs. These California municipalities were able to access
the markets quickly because the legal authority to issue PFBs, which de-
rives from the powers provided to a municipality by each state's consti-
tution, legislation, and court rulings, was already in place in California.
Prerequisitesfor Implementing PFBs
Pension funding bonds share many common characteristics with other
types of publicly issued municipal securities. Investors demand that any
municipal security, including PFBs, must be legally authorized by the
municipality, debt service must be supported by a sufficient stream of
municipal revenues, and bondholders must be entitled to reasonable
protections.
LegalAuthority
A municipality can derive the legal authority to issue PFBs in two ways.
First, it may determine that existing state law permits the issuance and
repayment of PFBs. To make this detennination, the municipality may
rely on the advice of a prominent law firm familial- with state law. How-
ever, to be confident that this new approach is unquestionably autho-
rized under existing law, several PFB issuers have taken the additional
step of validating the legal theory by challenging themselves in court.
Specifically, California municipalities, including the city of Fresno and
the counties of Alameda, Los Angeles, and Sonoma, have obtained rul-
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ings from the California Superior Court that pension bonds are legal,
valid, and binding obligations of these jurisdictions, consistent with state
laws and rulings dating from 1937 to the present. Second, legislation can
be enacted, typically by the state legislature, that specifically authorizes
the state and/or its political subdivisions to issue PFBs, proscribes the
manner and method for issuing such bonds, and delineates the various
sources of government revenues that can be pledged to the repayment
of the principal and interest due to bondholders.
Regardless whether PFBs are authorized by either existing or newly
enacted legislation, many state and local jurisdictions have legal re-
quirements that a majority of voters must directly approve any new debt
obligation. However, these legal requirements typically exempt the re-
financing of an existing obligation from reauthorization. The Califor-
nia cities and counties mentioned above have successfully validated in
California Superior Court that municipalities are legally bound to pay
unfunded pension obligations. Therefore, because pension bonds refi-
nance existing obligations, in some states PFBs do not need to be reau-
thorized by direct vote. This line of reasoning is commonly employed by
municipalities to refinance an existing bond issue, to raise funds to com-
ply with a court ruling such as school integration, or to satisfy a monetary
judgment levied against the municipality.
In addition to obtaining the authority to issue debt and to use govern-
mental revenues to repay the bonds, the municipality must specifically
choose the revenue source it will pledge to bondholders to repay the
principal and interest due on the PFBs.
Sources ofRepayment
Municipal governments can issue different types of securities that
carry different debt ratings, just as corporations can issue different
classes of senior and subordinated debt. Four types of repayment mech-
anisms will be discussed here. First, the "general obligation pledge,"
which carries the full faith and credit of the municipality, is the strongest
type of security. This pledge would require the government to increase
taxes until sufficient revenues are generated to repay the full amount of
debt service due each year on the bonds.
Alternatively, the municipality may provide a "general fund pledge"
by agreeing that it will budget and appropriate funds each year to repay
the bonds, but only to the extent that money is available to pay debt
service. This general fund pledge carries a slightly weaker credit rating
than a general obligation pledge and therefore carries a slightly higher
interest cost, but is still widely accepted by investors as a creditworthy
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securi ty. A general fund pledge to only pay debt service if revenue is avail-
able in a given year closely parallels the current arrangement for repay-
ing the VAAL, providing credibility to the argument that the PFBs are
merely a refinancing of an existing obligation. Most California PFBs
carry a general fund pledge.
Third, the PFB issuer may pledge a specific source of revenue to the
repayment of the bonds, such as funds generated by a gasoline tax or a
sales tax. This type of security can either be stronger or weaker than a
general fund pledge, depending on economic conditions affecting the
volume of sales being taxed. This type of pledge often requires voter
approval.
Finally, to the extent that state law permits, cities and other political
subdivisions may provide bondholders with a "state aid intercept mecha-
nism" whereby the jurisdiction assigns its rights to receive state aid (such
as a share of state motor vehicle licensing fees) to the PFB investors
through a bond trustee. The bond trustee will directly receive the muni-
cipality'S share of state funds, which are used to pay bond debt service,
and only the remaining funds are passed through to the municipality
that issued the PFBs. The municipality may also make additional pay-
ments if the state intercept money is not sufficient to repay the bonds
fully.
A municipality may combine several of the above revenue sources to
provide a particularly strong security, or it may create an entirely dif-
ferent type of security. These four security structures are only a few per-
mutations of "pension funding bonds." In practice, nearly any debt
incurred when pension fund contributions are modified can be con-
strued as PFBs.
Debt Ratings
Consistent with the judicial rulings discussed above, Moody's Investor
Service and Standard & Poor's Corporation have taken the view that pen-
sion bonds simply refinance a municipality's existing obligation to repay
its VAAL. A recent Standard & Poor's rating analysis obsetved that the
PFB being reviewed "shifts a portion of an off-balance sheet VAAL to on-
balance sheet" (S&P 1995:30).
To the extent that pension bonds are used only to fund unfunded lia-
bilities, this analysis may be reasonable. However, because there is no
standard accepted definition of a PFB, it is possible to issue pension
bonds not only to refinance a VAAL amortization schedule but also to
borrow funds to make the current fiscal year's normal contribution. De-
pending on the municipality's overall debt burden and alternative bor-
rowing costs, this approach may be prudent, but it may also serve as a
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mechanism for generating one-time budgetary relief that is similar to a
decision to skip an annual normal contribution. Any irresponsible use
of debt could cause a municipality's debt ratings to be lowered, not only
for the PFB bond issue but for all other outstanding debt issues. The
strength of a municipality's credit ratings will strongly influence its ability
to earn a positive net rate of return by issuing PFBs. The interest rate for
a pension bond issue will be determined by investor perception of the
municipality's credit risk relative to other bonds available in the market.
Municipalities with weak credit ratings may prefer to continue to
amortize the UAAL at the actuarially assumed interest rate. Under the
current arrangement, a poorly rated government's employees take ma-
terial credit risk by maintaining a UAAL as a plan asset. Bondholders will
not welcome the opportunity to step into the plan's shoes as creditors of
a poorly rated municipality, and PFB interest rates may be higher than
the plan's projected rate of return. On the other hand, municipalities
that enjoy strong credit ratings, consistently make retirement plan con-
tributions, and maintain sound actuarial and accounting practices may
find it cost-effective to issue PFBs.
Under the assumption that the PFBs are well structured, the invest-
ment of the proceeds by the public plan is also an important ratings fac-
tor. The rating agencies are not troubled by public plan investments that
are consistent with commonly accepted investment practice. Equities
and bonds are acceptable, but exotic derivatives raise questions. For ex-
ample, Moody's determined that "the asset allocation plan" of Alameda
County, California "is viewed as prudent, with investments distributed
40 percent in equities, 37 percent in fixed-income, 12 percent in real
estate, 10 percent in international, and 1 percent in cash" (Schaffer et al.
1995). Whether the rating agencies should be more concerned about
the market and credit risk of these investments is subject to further
debate.
Impacts of PFB Approach on Public Employers and
Public Plan Beneficiaries
A PFB issue alters the municipal employer's UAAL amortization pay-
ments to its retirement plans, changing the status quo funding cost, in-
vestment risk, financial flexibility, and long-term funding progress of the
municipality and its employee retirement plan.
To the extent that municipalities maintain a defined benefit plan and
invest capital in risky assets to fund such plans, municipalities perform
the role of an investment company. The basic purposes of an investment
company are first, to borrow at the lowest possible cost and second, to
invest the borrowed funds at the highest rates of return that can be ob-
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tained at acceptable levels of risk. In concept, PFBs allow municipalities
borrow funds against their excellent ratings at a low cost, enabling public
retirement plans to invest in capital markets assets such as equities and
corporate bonds. It is helpful to note that, in the absence of a PFB issue,
the municipal employer would continue to make annual VAAL amorti-
zation payments into its plan, and the plan would invest these funds in
equities and corporate bonds.
Funding Cost
Municipalities with high-quality debt ratings (at least "A" from
Moody's and/or Standard & Poor's) have been able to access the credit
markets at interest rates ranging from 25 basis points more than Treasury
securities in the shorter maturity ranges to interest rates of approxi-
mately 90 basis points more than Treasury securities for longer-term
(such as thirty-year) maturities. These relationships fluctuate constantly
under changing market conditions.
By issuing serial bonds that have principal maturing each year rather
than a single long-term maturity, PFB issuers are able to benefit from the
slope of the yield curve, or the difference between short-term and long-
term interest rates. The County of Sonoma, California and the City of
Fresno, California issued PFBs at an overall interest cost of approxi-
mately 6.75 percent and 7.50 percent, respectively. To date, both the
Sonoma and Fresno plans have earned double-digit rates of return on
the PFB proceeds, and both plans continue to project long-term rates of
return in excess of their employers' respective borrowing costs.
The most significant risk in locking in the funding cost is that the
plans' actual returns will fluctuate over time. If the long-term return on
plan investments is equal to the employer's borrowing cost, the employer
will break even relative to its borrowing cost. If the average return ex-
ceeds projections, the municipality will realize increased savings from
the PFB issue (although the employer is forbidden by federal law from
removing excess funds from the plan, the employer may choose to elimi-
nate normal contributions temporarily when the plan is projected to be
overfunded). If the average return declines below the PFB borrowing
cost, the municipality's borrowing rate will exceed its investment return,
causing a net loss and necessitating additional unfunded liability pay-
ments from the employer.
Two other potential risks that must be considered are the additional
investment risk that may be created by a lump-sum deposit of bond pro-
ceeds, and the excessive optimism required in a public plan's rate of re-
turn forecast if it believes that it can earn a higher long-term return than
the employer'S PFB borrowing cost.
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Investment Risk
First, a plan receiving a lump-sum payment may invest the funds at a
particularly poor time in the market cycle. For example, a municipality
with a US $2 billion UAAL might issue US $two billion of PFBs, as the
County of Los Angeles did in 1994. This lump sum was deposited to the
public plan all at once, as opposed to a series ofrelatively smaller contri-
butions over many years.
One issue is whether the lump sum would be invested in the same
types of securities that would have been purchased with annual amorti-
zation payments. Because all funds deposited, whether from normal con-
tributions, UAAL amortization payments, or PFB proceeds, are invested
in equities and bonds, it is unlikely that a lump-sum deposit would be
invested any differently than annual payments, particularly if the public
fund passively indexes its investments. PFBs do not appear to increase
the types of risks assumed by public plans. A second consideration is
whether a large investment by anyone public plan will materially af-
fect market prices. Assuming that the plan maintains a fairly typical
asset allocation or indexes its investments within each asset class, market
prices for equities and bonds purchased by the plan should remain rela-
tively unaffected.
Therefore, ifPFB proceeds do not change the types ofassets purchased,
and the size of the purchase does not independently increase the cost of
the assets purchased, the remaining question is whether the plan assumes
a large incremental risk by investing the PFB proceeds at anyone point
in time. Under the status quo, the employer typically makes bimonthly
UAAL amortization payments to the plan, thus providing the plan with a
fairly consistent stream of revenue to invest each month. Therefore, in-
vesting the present value of the future UAAL payments at one point in
time could cause the plan to experience higher or lower returns over the
long run than if the funds were invested over time. It is difficult to evaluate
whether a plan would be better offor worse offby changing its investment
of the UAAL amortization payments. Theoretically, there is no way to
predict which method will yield better future returns.
What may be helpful is to compare the PFB lump-sum investment ac-
tivity in the context of the plan's other investment activities. Public plans
regularly reallocate funds among asset classes, based either on judg-
ments about future market conditions or to match investment income
more closely with their projected cash-flow needs. Therefore, a plan's
ongoing investing activities emulate lump-sum investments. For example,
a public plan may have US $100 billion of plan assets, of which it may
choose to increase its asset allocation in equities by 5 percent and de-
crease its asset allocation in bonds by 5 percent. Even such a modest
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reallocation will involve the sale of US $5 billion of bonds and the pur-
chase of US $5 billion of equities, presumably over as relatively short a
time horizon as a three-month period. Unless the PFB proceeds provide
a substantially large increase in plan assets, the risk associated with the
lump-sum investment of the PFB deposit will closely resemble the risks
that the plan regularly takes when reallocating its assets.
Therefore, the incremental risk introduced by the lump-sum invest-
ment of the PFB proceeds may be material and should not be under-
estimated, but any determination of the acceptability of this risk must be
placed within the context of a plan's ongoing risk-taking activities.
Projected Rates ofReturn
When a retirement plan believes it can reinvest bond proceeds at a
higher rate of return than the employer's borrowing cost, it is logical to
ask whether the plan's projected rate of return (also referred to as actu-
arially assumed in terest rate) is realistic.
There are three factors that may help a plan may to consider why its
rate of return is projected to be higher than the PFB borrowing cost.
First, the general level of market interest rates may have declined rapidly
over a recent period of time, and the plan's forecasts do not adequately
reflect changing market rates of return. A decline in interest rates would
enable the employer to issue relatively low-cost PFBs, for example, at an
interest rate of 6.75 percent, while a plan's projected long-term rate of
return may remain unchanged at 8.09 percent. If the plan's return on
future investments is closely correlated to the future level of interest
rates, declines in market interest rates may be a signal that the plan's
projected long-term rate of return should be lowered.
However, a plan may believe that interest rates have declined only tem-
porarily and, while the employer will benefit from borrowing at low rates,
the plan will invest its assets gradually over a 12-month period to capture
increases in interest rates. Acting on the belief that interest rates are only
temporarily lower may appear to be a bold market call, particularly for a
public plan, but as discussed above a US $100 billion public plan with
40 percent of its assets in bonds is already taking a meaningful position
on the future level of interest rates.
Another possible reason that the plan may not need to reduce its ex-
pected rate of return after a sharp decline in interest rates is that retire-
ment plans' actual returns oflO.62 percent between 1988 and 1992 have
exceeded the plans' projected rates of return of 8.09 percent (Zorn and
Eitelberg 1994). Thus, plans may already believe there is a sufficient mar-
gin for error embedded in their projected returns.
When comparing a plan's projected investment returns with a public
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employer's borrowing cost, a second factor to consider is the difference
in credit quality between the public employer's bond issuer rating and
the average rating of securities in which the plan is invested. If the em-
ployer carries a "AA+" rating from Standard & Poor's, for example, and
the plan invests in securities with an average credit rating of "A," then
the employer's borrowing cost should be lower than the plan's returns.
Some may argue that a public employer may be leveraging its excellent
credit rating to fund the plan, but recall that the employer is already
obligated to make the annual VAAL amortization payments ifit does not
issue the PFB, and the rating agency's assessment of the employer has
already included the projected VAAL amortization payments. Further-
more, the plan is already investing in securities ofa certain credit quality,
independent of the employer's decision to issue PFBs, and under either
the status quo or PFB alternatives, the employer remains obligated to pay
any unfunded liability of the plan.
Beyond considerations of whether a plan's currently projected rate of
return has an adequate margin for error, or whether net returns are
generated by differences in credit ratings, a third factor to consider is
whether a plan's overall investment returns can remain high even when
bond yields decline. Assuming that a recent drop in bond yields is per-
manent and not a temporary opportunity to borrow at unusually low in-
terest rates, a plan's asset allocation may still enable it to generate higher
rates of return than the employer's borrowing cost.
For example, if the plan invests 60 percent of its assets in equities and
40 percent in corporate bonds, the plan could earn a high total rate of
return on its equity investments, such as 9 percent, even though it may
only break even on the corporate bond portion of its portfolio, which
could yield a return equivalent to the employer's borrowing cost, such as
7.5 percent. Even f01" the bond portion of its portfolio, the municipal
employer still enjoys the benefit of a small tax arbitrage because interest
on the municipality's bonds are exempt from state taxes and therefore
carry yields slightly below comparably rated corporate bonds.
A municipal employer considering the issuance of PFBs should very
carefully consider these issues relating to its retiremen t plan's projected
rates of return. If the plan should fail to earn a rate of return equal to its
projected rate of return, the plan will have an additional unfunded lia-
bility and the employer will be obligated to make additionalfuture VAAL
payments to the plan.
Financial Impact: Precludes Ability to Skip Payments
Employers that have unfunded liabilities enjoy certain repayment pro-
visions unavailable to other debtors, such as the ability to skip a payment
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at will or to extend the final maturity of the obligation each year. How-
ever, when plan returns exceed borrowing costs, this flexibility comes at
a price.
Some municipalities may not value the flexibility to skip VAAL amor-
tization payments, being satisfied that the ability to skip a future normal
contribution preserves sufficient financial flexibility. Other municipali-
ties may want to retain the ability to skip both normal and VAAL amor-
tization contributions. In the latter case, taxpayers or public employees
may benefit from the discipline imposed by the externalization of the
debt (if they believe that the employer would not default on its debt ser-
vice obligations to PFB investors).
If legislation is necessary to implement the PFB, policymakers may
choose to mandate that no additional unfunded liabilities may be inten-
tionally created. This may be helpful not only to ensure that the munici-
pality does not skip future normal contribution payments but also that
public employees-seeing that the plan is fully funded-do not create
pressure to create new unfunded liabilities by increasing benefits.
Financial Impact: Additional Unfunded Liabilities Still Possible
Additional unfunded liabilities may still arise unintentionally. Due to
the defined benefit nature of the employer's obligation, it is difficult to
predict a plan's actual liabilities. It is possible that in a given year a mu-
nicipality would have to pay both PFB debt service and the amortization
of a newly created VAAL. A political risk created by PFBs is that voters
may be unwilling to begin amortizing a new VAAL within a few years
after bonds were issued fully to extinguish the formerly projected VAAL.
Financial Impact: Possible to Overfund Plan
Actuaries have raised the concern that under some circumstances a
PFB issue could result in the "terminal overfunding" of a plan. This
would occur if a plan reached a high enough surplus that its invest-
ments were projected to generate enough income each year to pay all
plan benefits, even without any annual normal contributions from the
employer. (Once PFB proceeds are deposited to the plan, the funds can-
not be withdrawn by the employer.)
For open (ongoing) public plans, employment will typically increase
over time and benefits will continue to be increased, both of which
would decrease the plan's surplus if additional normal contributions
were not made. Despite the permanence implied in the diagnosis, "ter-
minal overfunding" for open plans is only a temporary condition, and
one that would be welcomed by most public plans.
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The terminal overfunding concern is relevant, however, for closed
plans, which do not accept new members. A closed fund facing terminal
overfunding could invest a substantial proportion of its assets in Treasury
bills, lowering the expected surplus (due to a lower rate of return on
Treasury bills than the projected return of a diversified portfolio) but
protecting the plan from any investment performance risks. Further-
more, plan benefits could be increased to draw down the plan's assets
faster than original projections. Employers funding a closed plan's VAAL
with PFBs should be particularly cautious, as there are far fewer mecha-
nisms available to adjust the plan's ongoing cash flows over time.
Financial Impact: PFBs Do Not Allow Negative Amortization
If plans are currently making actual funding progress, contributing
funds each year to pay the full amount of interest due on the VAAL plus
a portion of the principal amount of the VAAL, it is possible under cer-
tain market conditions to structure pension funding bonds that will pro-
vide a financial gain to the employer. However, as discussed above, some
municipalities have severe negative amortization, and even a PFB issued
as a single, long-term maturity would require the municipality to make
interest payments which may exceed the current VAAL amortization pay-
ments. Investors are accustomed to receiving interest and principal pay-
ments each year, and converting a level percentage of payroll payment
to a flat-level dollar payment may require cash flow changes.
Gary Finley, the Executive Director of the Missouri State Employees
Retirement System and a skeptic of PFB issuance, has analyzed the mis-
match between amortization patterns, concluding that special structur-
ing techniques are often needed to avoid this dilemma (Finley 1994).
One structuring alternative available is the issuance of discount (zero-
coupon) PFBs that do not pay interest until maturity. However, PFB in-
vestors have not widely accepted such a structure at a cost-effective
interest rate. Municipalities with severe negative VAAL amortization
patterns have the most to gain over the long term by increasing their
annual payments to amortize the VAAL, as interest on interest is avoided
in the later years-potentially saving billions of dollars for some state
governments.
Leaving aside a retirement plan's potential to earn a higher rate of
return than the employer's borrowing cost, a primary benefit of issuing
PFBs is that the employer may not have the discipline to make the annual
VAAL amortization payments, which is how the negative amortization
pattern may have been established. Similarly, a current state legislature
that has begun to make progress on the VAAL amortization may not feel
confident that a future legislature will continue these efforts. In either
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circumstance, a PFB issue can impose much-needed discipline into the
funding process. An employer that has adequate financial discipline, and
does not believe that it would benefit from the potential difference be-
tween its borrowing cost and its retirement plan's investment returns,
would be well-advised simply to increase its own annual UAAL amor-
tization payments without issuing a PFB. The self-disciplined approach
would enable the employer to save the administrative costs associated
with PFB issuance.
To summarize the financial impact of pension funding bonds, it may 11
be possible for public employee retirement plans to earn long-term rates •
of return that exceed employers' PFB borrowing costs, but it is also pos- 1...
sible that projected rate of return may be overestimated. Government
employers that need the added financial discipline imposed by annual
debt service payments, or are concerned about the discipline of future 1
elected officials, may welcome PFBs as a mechanism for increasing UAAL .,
amortization payments. However, this may prove difficult for municipal I
1
employers with severe negative amortization patterns, who would have 1
to increase their annual payments to refinance their UAAL with pension .~
funding bonds. Furthermore, employers that have the self-discipline to
increase their contributions without the added obligation imposed by
the capital markets can save administrative costs by increasing their con-
tributions of their own volition.
Gary Finley summarizes three of the most important financial con-
cerns relating to pension funding bonds. First, public officials may mis-
understand that funding the UAAL does not extinguish the employer's
ongoing obligation to meet all defined benefits. Second, employees may
view the municipality's cost savings as an opportunity to increase bene-
fits. Third, employers must consider whether an internal restructuring
of contributions to the plan could accomplish similar results (Finley
1994).
Conclusion
Public plans maintain over US $1 trillion in assets and are responsible
for the well-being of more than 13,000,000 public servants. Municipali-
ties would be well served to investigate the nature of the risks that tax-
payers assume as the providers of a defined benefit plan with uncertain
liabilities and as the effective guarantors of public plans' inherently risky
debt and equity investments.
Given the assumption that the defined benefit nature of plan liabilities
will remain unchanged and that public plans will continue to invest in
equities and bonds, this chapter has explored pension funding bonds as.
a technique for efficiently funding employer liabilities.
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PCBs offer the potential to fund liabilities at a lower interest cost than
the public retirement plans' projected investment return. Furthermore,
the funding discipline introduced by the obligation to pay an external
debt may benefit both taxpayers and employees. However, this discipline
is imposed through a reduction in financial flexibility.
It is important to recognize that the repayment of a currently pro-
jected unfunded liability does not prevent future unfunded liabilities
from being created, either due to increased benefits ordue to unexpected
changes in assets and liabilities. Municipalities with severely unfunded
liabilities, particularly those that presently incur negative amortization,
have the most to gain from the discipline imposed by PFBs but also
would experience difficult short-term financial adjustments. Municipali-
ties with high-quality ratings (at least "A" by Moody's and Standard &
Poor's) are most likely to issue PFBs and can successfully use the tech-
nique under certain market conditions to provide increased retirement
security to public employees at a lower cost to taxpayers.
Pension bonds attempt to reconfigure complex flows of funds, taking
into consideration dynamic effects that occur over time. The complexity
of the predicted interactions among benefits due and plan assets are
compounded for multiemployer retirement plans, such as statewide
teachers' retirement systems.
This chapter has attempted to provide an introductory discussion of
issues relating to the concept of pension funding bonds issued by state
and local government employers, and the potential costs and benefits of
the approach. A maxim familiar to students of American government is
that "all politics is local." Similarly, the determination of whether pen-
sion funding bonds are suitable for a particular municipal employer
and its public employee retirement plan is best evaluated on a case-by-
case basis.
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